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Theory
• It is expected that the frequency of party turnover over 
time will impact levels of corruption in democratic 
governments.
• If there are low rates of party turnover, elected officials 
within a specific party may feel insulated from the 
public and become prone to corrupt behaviour.
• High rates of party turnover, however, may indicate 
excessive voting instability by constituents, causing 
elected officials to act corruptly 
H1: An intermediate frequency of party turnover 
over time will result in optimal control of 
corruption.
• Intermediate levels of party turnover will encourage 
the highest rates of voter participation, voters feel their 
voice has more of an impact than at the extreme 
turnover frequencies.
• High levels of voter participation help control corrupt 
behavior by elected officials who fear the consequences
H2: Intermediate frequencies of party turnover 
will result in highest voter participation, which 
then acts as a mechanism to control corruption
INTRODUCTION
• Corruption, defined as the misuse of public office for 
private gain, is a persistent issue within governments 
throughout the international community. 
• Higher levels of corruption are correlated with lower 
educational and private investments, poorer economic 
performance, and a mistrust of democracy in the most 
highly affected governments.
• Therefore, it is imperative for democratic governments 
to deter corruption in order to maintain the civil 
liberties of its citizens and promote national well-being 
in myriad areas.
• This thesis investigates whether relative accountability 
of elected officials, reflected by instances of party 
turnover in national elections over time, can provide 
democratic citizens an institutional mechanism to help 
control corruption in their respective governments. 
METHOD
• A cross-national study, observing the frequencies of 
executive party turnover over time on corruption 
perceptions rankings. 
• The outcome variable is measured is the 
preponderance of corruption in 2015, provided by 
three separate indices: Corruption Perceptions Index 
(CPI), Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), and 
Varieties of Democracy (VDEM)
• The main explanatory variable is the total number of 
instances the party of the chief executive changed after 
an election during the period of time preceding the 
2015 state of corruption, data provided by the 
Database of Political Institutions (DPI)
• The study is separated into four time periods leading 
up to the 2015 state of corruption; Model 1 covers the 
explanatory measures within continuous democracies 
from 1975-2015,  Model 2 covers 1985-2015, Model 3 
observes 1995-2015, and Model 4 consists of the years 
2005-2015 
• Quadratic regression analysis using the following 
equation:
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟
2 + 𝛽3 ∗
𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎 𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽6 ∗
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑃𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 + 𝜖
RESULTS
• No substantial support for the first hypothesis in most 
of the four quadratic regression tests. 
• Using CPI and WGI 2015 Scores as the outcome 
variable, lower frequencies of party turnover is more 
associated with greater control of corruption. 
• Using VDEM 2015 Scores as the outcome variable, 
intermediate party turnover frequency results in the 
greatest prevalence of corruption in continuous 
democracies.
• The second hypothesis test showed some support for 
the expected results.
• However, the linear relationship between voter 
participation and corruption lacked statistical 
significance, preventing conclusive evidence that voter 
participation is a mechanism of intermediate party 
turnover to help control corruption.
• Other factors such as media and interest group bias, 
economic development, and world region appear to 
have an effect on the state of corruption in 2015.
The estimated relationships between preceding party turnover frequencies and 
CPI Scores in 2015
RESULTS
Estimated results: party turnover frequency from 1985-2015 and 
voter election turnout from 1985-2015 
Estimated results: voter turnout rate and CPI Score 2015
CONCLUSIONS
• Depending on the measure of corruption, preceding 
trends of party turnover have conflicting effects on the 
state of government corruption.
• This research does not support the hypothesis that an 
intermediate frequency of party turnover will result in 
the greatest deterrence of corruption. 
• Unbiased media, politically diverse interest group 
advertisements, and economic development all help 
control government corruption.
• There are notable discrepancies in corruption 
measures, particularly CPI, WGI, and VDEM indices, 
which merit further study in the future.
The expected relationship 
between party turnover 
frequencies and the 
corresponding control of 
corruption over time
• The second hypothesis requires a two part test.
• Regression analysis of party turnover frequency on 
voter participation 
• If intermediate party turnover yields the highest 
levels of voter participation, it can be considered a 
potential mechanism of intermediate party turnover.
• Voter participation rates in democracies undergo 
linear regression analysis with the 2015 state of 
corruption acting as the outcome variable. 
• Once voter participation is regressed on 2015 CPI 
scores, there is an expected positive relationship 
between voter turnout rates and control of 
corruption.
The estimated relationships between preceding party turnover frequencies 
and the VDEM Control of Corruption Index in 2015
The expected relationship 
between party turnover 
frequencies and average 
voter participation 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CPI  2015 CPI 2015 CPI 2015 CPI 2015
1975-2015 1985-2015 1995-2015 2005-2015
Voter Turnout 0.0973 0.0808 0.167 0.133
(0.196) (0.171) (0.139) (0.104)
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Includes controls for Media Bias, Interest Group Advertisement, World 
Region, GDP Per Capita, and Election Frequency
